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Introduction
A fundamental property right conferred upon stockholders of a firm is that they are
entitled to their fair share of the firm’s (distributable) net income. Since stock owner-
ship is verifiable, this right is relatively easy to enforce provided that everyone agrees
on what the income is. In a world of complete information, determining net income
should be a relatively simple matter because it is clear to everyone to see how much
money is left on the table after all senior claimants (creditors, managers, employees,
taxman, ...) have been paid. Matters become more tricky in a world of asymmetric
information where inside shareholders may know more than outside shareholders.
How is income reported and payout determined if asymmetric information is a fact
of life? What are the effects of information asymmetry on insiders’ production decision
or incentives to put in effort? How does asymmetric information affect the time-series
properties of reported income and payout? How does inside ownership affect income
and operating efficiency? These are some of the questions we try to address in this
paper.
We consider an all-equity financed firm that pays out each period all realized income.
In our model outsiders can extract their share of income from the firm by a threat
of collective action against insiders.1 While under symmetric information outsiders
know exactly what they are due, under asymmetric information outsiders refrain from
intervention for as long as the reported income (and corresponding payout) meets
their expectations. Outsiders (supported by analysts) form their expectations about
income on the basis of the information available to them. Outsiders’ income estimate
is unbiased and “best” based on the information they have available, and it is therefore
rational for them to require a payout that is consistent with their expectations.2 Hence,
1If collective action is costly (as in Myers (2000), Jin and Myers (2006), Lambrecht and Myers
(2007, 2008), Acharya, Myers and Rajan (2011), among others) then this gives insiders scope to
extract rents, which erodes outsiders’ stake in the firm’s income and the value of the outside equity. A
strictly positive cost of intervention is not central to our paper. We rule out, however, the possibility
that property rights are void and outsiders cannot extract any income from the firm as this would
completely undermine the firm’s capability to raise outside equity in the first place.
2Policies where insiders pay out according to realized income would be “fragile” for insiders. For
instance, if realized payouts are repeatedly below outsiders’ estimates, then outsiders may believe they
are being taken for a ride by insiders and intervene.
1
when the strength of property rights and pressure by outside investors keeps insiders to
the straight and narrow, the equilibrium payout will be smooth compared to realized
income as it is based on outsiders’ expectation. Insiders absorb short-term variation
in income and, if necessary, have to “find the money” to keep outside investors at bay.
So far smoothing is fairly harmless in that it merely irons out variation in reported
income. We call it “financial smoothing” because it merely alters the time pattern of
reported income (through borrowing and savings) without changing the firm’s under-
lying cash-flows as determined by insiders’ production and effort decisions. Insiders
may, however, also engage in “real smoothing” by manipulating production and effort
decisions in an attempt to “manage” outsiders’ expectations. In particular, suppose
outsiders cannot observe value-relevant variables (such as marginal costs) directly but
have to rely on an incomplete set of observable proxies (such as output or sales) in
order to infer income indirectly. Then insiders may have an incentive to distort the
observable proxy variables in order to lower outsiders’ expectations about current and
future income. The logic of this results is as follows.
Suppose that outsiders can observe realized sales (revenues) but not costs. In
particular, the firm’s marginal cost is a stochastic latent variable. While outsiders do
not know the realization of the marginal cost, the parameters that drive the marginal
cost process are common knowledge. As before outsiders expect their fair share of
income. Insiders know that outsiders associate a higher sales level with lower marginal
costs. Therefore, upon observing higher sales, outsiders expect income to be higher
and want higher payout. In an attempt to manage outsiders’ expectations, insiders
underproduce and cut output up to the point where the cost in terms of reducing
expected income equals the benefit of lowering outsiders’ payout expectations.
In contrast, in an environment of symmetric information where payout to outsiders
is a function of actual income (i.e., cash-flows), insiders determine the firm’s output
(and sales) level at the first-best by setting marginal costs equal to marginal revenues.3
Now, though insiders underproduce in order to manage outsiders’ expectations, in
equilibrium they are not successful in their attempt because insiders anticipate what is
going on and can still infer from sales the value of the latent cost variable if that is the
3In effect, insiders have an incentive to maximize total firm value and to put in the optimal effort
level if they get (i) a constant fraction of the firm’s actual (i.e., realized) income and, (ii) a perfectly
competitive remuneration (taken upfront out of gross revenues) for their cost of effort.
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only unobservable (i.e., assuming there are no other unknowns to outsiders). Reported
income therefore coincides with actual income. Nevertheless, indirect inference of costs
through sales distorts insiders’ actions and traps them into behaving sub-optimally.
Next, assume that observed sales are affected each period by an additive, indepen-
dently and identically distributed, noise term, the realization of which is unknown to
insiders at the time when they set the output level. The noise term could, for instance,
reflect measurement error. Such noise causes sales to become an imperfect (noisy) mea-
sure of the latent marginal cost variable. As a result outsiders can no longer infer the
exact realization of actual income because they do not know whether a change in sales
is due to measurement error or a change in the latent cost variable. However, since
measurement errors are transitory and shocks to costs persistent, the underlying source
of change gradually becomes clear over time. Therefore, outsiders calculate their best
estimate of income on the basis of not only current sales but also past sales. Indeed,
while the current sales figure could be unduly influenced by measurement error, an
estimate based on the full sales history smooths out the effect of these errors.
Formally, outsiders’ income estimate is the solution to a filtering problem. We adopt
in particular the Kalman filter because for our linear model with Gaussian disturbances
the Kalman filter gives an unbiased, minimum variance and consistent estimate of
actual (i.e., realized) income.4 While at any given time the Kalman filter is an inexact
estimate of actual income, the measure is right on average and optimal among all
possible estimators.
Then, in a rational expectations equilibrium outsiders calculate their expectation of
actual income on the basis of realized sales and of what they believe insiders’ optimal
output and effort policy to be. Conversely, insiders determine each period their optimal
effort and output policy given outsiders’ beliefs. In equilibrium insiders’ actions are
consistent with outsiders’ beliefs and outsiders’ expectations are unbiased conditional
on the information available. Each period outsiders receive a payout that equals their
share of what they expect income to be. Insiders also get a payout but they have to soak
up any under (over) payment to outsiders as some kind of discretionary remuneration
(charge): if actual income is higher (lower) than outsiders’ estimate then insiders cash
in (make up for) the difference in outsiders’ payout.
4 For an early forecasting application of the Kalman filter in the context of earnings numbers, see
Lieber, Melnick, and Ronen (1983), who use the filter to deal with transitory noise in earnings.
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We thus obtain “income smoothing” because insiders report an income figure that
corresponds to outsiders’ beliefs. Consequently, reported income and payout are smooth
compared to actual income not because insiders want to smooth income, but because in-
siders have to meet outsiders’ expectations to avoid intervention. Importantly, smooth-
ing also happens in an inter-temporal sense. The efficient output and effort level is
determined in our model by the contemporaneous level only of the latent marginal cost
variable; however, the current effort and output decision not only affect current sales
levels but also outsiders’ expectations of current and all future income. This exacer-
bates the previously discussed negative externality for insiders because bumping up sales
now means the outsiders will expect higher income and payout not only now but also
in future. Even though the spillover effect of a one-off increase in sales on outsiders’
future expectations wears off over time, it still causes insiders to underproduce even
more and to put in even lower effort compared to what is first best.5
There is direct support for our model in the survey-based findings of Graham, Har-
vey, and Rajgopal (2005): (i) insiders (managers) always try to meet outsiders’ earnings
per share (EPS) expectations at all costs to avoid serious repercussions; and, (ii) many
managers under-invest to smooth earnings and therefore engage in real smoothing. The
first is one of the key premises of our model and the second is a key implication of the
model.6 There is also indirect support for our model from the accounting literature.
For example, Roychowdhury (2006) finds evidence consistent with managers manipu-
5 We stress that intertemporal smoothing in our model does not result from risk aversion because
all agents are risk neutral. If insiders’ utility were a concave function of reported income then this
alone could be sufficient to generate smoothing in reported income. Managerial or insider risk aversion
is a pervasive feature and key driver in existing papers on income smoothing (see related literature in
section 5). Graham (2003) also explains and describes existing evidence that convexity of corporate
taxes in firm profits can lead to income smoothing, though it is unclear it should lead to “real”
smoothing.
6In our model insiders maximize the present value of their income stream subject to meeting
outsiders’ income expectation. Insiders’ actions are driven by “profit satisficing” (see Simon (1955))
and not by an “optimal” contract. Simon contrasts satisficing with optimization theory. The contrast
is between “looking for the sharpest needle in the haystack” (optimizing) and “looking for a needle
sharp enough to sew with” (satisficing) (Simon (1987), p244). The latter may be preferable once
agents’ bounded rationality and the complexity of the decision environment are taken into account.
Recently the idea of satisficing has also been extended to contracting problems: Bolton and Faure-
Grimaud (2010) formalize the notion that boundedly rational agents write satisficing contracts rather
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lating real activities to avoid reporting annual losses. There is also some evidence of
real activities manipulation to meet annual analyst forecasts.
Our theory of intertemporal income smoothing yields rich, testable and novel im-
plications on the time-series properties of reported income and payout to outsiders.
First, “reported income” is smooth compared to “actual income” because the former
is based on outsiders’ expectations whereas the latter corresponds to actual cash flow
realizations. Second, reported income follows inter-temporally a target adjustment
model. The “income target” is a linear, increasing function of sales, so that when
there is a shock to sales (and therefore to the income target), reported income adjusts
towards the new target, but adjustment is partial and distributed over time because
outsiders only gradually learn whether a shock to sales is due to measurement error
or due to a fundamental shift in the firm’s cost structure. Third, the current level of
reported income can be expressed as a distributed lag model of current and past sales,
where the weights on sales decline as we move further in the past. Since payout to
outsiders is a fraction of reported income, it follows that also payout can be expressed
as a distributed lag model of sales. Equivalently, current payout can be expressed as a
target adjustment model where current payout depends on current sales and previous
period’s payout, which is similar to the Lintner (1956) dividend model.7 Fourth, the
total amount of smoothing can be broken up in two components: “real” smoothing
and “financial” smoothing. While the latter does not alter the underlying cash flows,
the former results in under-investment and implies that the output level (and therefore
sales) becomes less sensitive to variation in the latent cost variable.8
than optimal contracts.
7A difference is that in the Lintner model target payout is linked to contemporaneous net income
and not contemporaneous sales. This difference follows from the fact that sales (and not income) is
the observable “anchor” variable in our model.
8We do not model how real and financial smoothing are actually implemented. The interested
reader is referred to the book by Ronen and Sadan (1981) in which various smoothing mechanisms
are discussed and illustrated in great detail. For an illustrative case example, we refer to the highly
publicized settlement that Microsoft reached with the SEC in 2002. The settlement marked the
end to years of investigation by the SEC over allegations that Microsoft was employing “cookie jar”
accounting practices in which it put aside income in certain quarters to pad future financial results
when the company did not meet expectations. The SEC said that Microsoft maintained seven reserve
accounts that did not comply with GAAP, because they did not have “adequately substantial bases.”
Still, under the settlement agreement Microsoft is admitting no explicit wrongdoing and is not obliged
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Importantly, smoothing increases with the degree of information asymmetry be-
tween insiders and investors. Holding constant the degree of information asymmetry
(as determined by the variance of the measurement error), smoothing and underpro-
duction in particular also increase with the outside shareholders’ ownership stake.
Conversely, a higher level of inside ownership leads to less real smoothing. Indeed,
the under-investment problem disappears as insiders move towards 100% ownership.9
We show that these effects lead to an “outside equity Laffer curve”: the value of the
total outside equity is an inverted U-shaped function of outsiders’ ownership stake.
The analogy with the taxation literature is straightforward: outsiders’ ownership stake
acts ex post like a proportional tax on distributable income and undermines insiders’
incentives to produce and put in effort.
This final result suggests that low inside ownership could have detrimental conse-
quences for the firm. We argue then that since outside equity may be crucial for the
development and expansion of owner-managed firms, our results offer a rationale for
imposing disclosure requirements on public companies and for improving accounting
and auditing quality. We show that, all else equal, introducing independent accounting
information, such as an unbiased but imprecise income estimate, improves economic
efficiency, increases the outside equity value, and acts as a substitute for a higher inside
ownership stake. The implication is that accounting quality, investments, size of pub-
lic stock markets, and economic growth are all positively correlated in our model, and
as empirically found in empirical literature on finance and growth (King and Levine
(1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998) among others).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the benchmark
case with symmetric information between outsiders and insiders. Section 2 analyzes
the asymmetric information model. Section 3 discusses the robustness and extensions
of the model, in particular, the insiders’ participation constraint and the value of
audited disclosure. Section 4 presents additional empirical implications. Section 5
to pay a fine.
9Intuitively, the smaller the insiders’ stake, the smaller is the group of insiders that has to soak up
income shocks for a larger group of outsiders. Any variation in sales feeds into outsiders’ expectations
and is “levered” up to the extent that insiders own a smaller stake. This creates an incentive for
insiders to underproduce and to make output (and therefore sales) less sensitive to changes in the
latent cost variable. In the extreme case where insiders have no stake left in the firm they produce
little or nothing, irrespective of the marginal cost level.
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briefly relates our paper to existing literature. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are in the
appendix.
1 Symmetric information case
Consider a firm with access to a productive technology. The output from the technol-
ogy is sold at a fixed unit price, but its scale can be varied. Marginal costs of production
follow an AR(1) process with a drift that depends on the effort exercised by the tech-
nology operators. Each period marginal costs are revealed before the output scale is
chosen. A part of the firm is owned by risk-neutral shareholders (outsiders) and the
rest by risk-neutral insiders who also act as the technology operators. To start with,
we focus on the first-best scenario in which there is congruence of objectives between
outsiders and insiders, and information about marginal costs is known symmetrically
to both outsiders and insiders.
Formally, we consider a firm with the following income function:
pit = qt − q
2
t
2xt
− 1
2
ce2t (1)
where xt = Axt−1 + B et + wt−1 with wt−1 ∼ N(0, Q) , (2)
et and qt denote the chosen effort and output level. The (inverse) marginal production
cost variable xt follows an AR(1) process with auto-regressive coefficient A ∈ [0, 1) (so
that the effect of current effort on future values of x declines over time), a drift Bet,
and an i.i.d. noise term wt−1. The term ce2t/2 represents the cost of effort expressed
in monetary terms. Effort increases the value for xt, which in turn lowers the firm’s
marginal cost of production. Effort therefore increases the efficiency of the firm’s
production process. et and qt are implemented after the realization of wt−1 is observed.
All shareholders are risk-neutral, can borrow and save at the risk free rate, and
have a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The value of the firm is given by the present value
of discounted income:
Vt = max
et+j , qt+j ,j=0...∞
Et[
∞∑
j=0
βjpit+j] = max
qt+j ,j=0...∞
Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
βj
(
qt+j −
q2t+j
2xt+j
− 1
2
ce2t+j
)]
(3)
Then, the first-best policies that maximize firm value are as follows.
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Proposition 1 The first-best production policy and effort level are respectively
qot = xt , (4)
eot =
B
2c(1− βA) ≡ e
o . (5)
The firm’s actual (i.e., realized) income and total payout under the first-best policy are
given by:
piot =
xt
2
− 1
2
ceo2 . (6)
The proposition shows that the first-best effort is constant over time and increasing
in the autoregressive coefficient A, because with non-zero autocorrelation (A > 0) the
effort level et not only affects the contemporaneous level of xt, but also all future levels
xt+i.
The first-best output level qot equals xt. Recall that a higher value for xt implies
lower marginal costs. Therefore, the output level rises with xt. As xt goes to zero,
marginal costs spiral out of control and the first-best output quantity goes to zero. Since
the shocks that drive xt are normally distributed, marginal costs could theoretically
become negative. The solution in proposition 1 no longer makes sense for negative
xt because marginal costs can, of course, not be negative. The likelihood of negative
values for xt arising is, however, negligible small if the stationary unconditional mean
of xt (given by
Be
1−A) is sufficiently large relative to the unconditional variance of xt
(given by Q
1−A2 ). We assume this condition to be satisfied so that we can safely ignore
the occurrence of negative costs.10
Finally, note that there is a mapping from the cost variable (xt) to the output
level (qt) and the actual income level (pit). This is important for section 2 where xt is
unobservable to outside shareholders and has to be inferred from an observable proxy.
10To rule out negative values for xt altogether one could assume that xt is log-normally distributed.
This would, however, make the Bayesian updating process deployed in next section completely in-
tractable. We will therefore stick to the normal distribution throughout this paper. The normality
assumption is standard in the information economics literature. For example, Kyle (1985) and the
large number of papers that originated from this paper all assume for sake of tractability that asset
prices are normally distributed.
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1.1 Inside and outside shareholders
So far we have assumed that all shareholders can be treated as a homogenous group
that controls the firm. We now relax this assumption by introducing inside and outside
shareholders who, respectively, own a fraction (1 − ϕ) and ϕ of the shares, ϕ ∈ [0, 1].
For example, insiders (managers and even board members involved in firm’s operating
decisions) typically own the majority of shares of private firms (ϕ < 0.5), whereas for
public firms it is more common that outsiders own the majority of shares (ϕ > 0.5).
Insiders set production policy (qt) and exert effort (et). We assume that the market
for insiders is competitive with their reservation wages normalized to zero, so that
insiders get a monetary compensation that equals their total cost of effort (i.e., ce2t/2).
Under symmetric information outsiders can infer from xt (or qt) exactly how much
effort insiders exert. Outsiders can therefore pay the competitive remuneration for
the exerted effort. In our model partial ownership does not by itself distort insiders’
effort because the efficient outcome is achieved under symmetric information. Paying
a competitive wage for effort exerted allows us to abstract from compensation issues
and to focus purely on the conflict between inside and outside shareholders that results
from asymmetric information.11
Analogous to Fluck (1998), Myers (2000), Jin and Myers (2006), Lambrecht and
Myers (2007, 2008, 2011), and Acharya, Myers and Rajan (2011), we assume that
insiders operate subject to a threat of collective action. Outsiders’ payoff from collective
action is given by ϕαVt where α (∈ [0, 1]) reflects the degree of investor protection.
To avoid collective action, insiders pay out each period a dividend dt that leaves
outsiders indifferent between intervening and leaving insiders unchallenged for another
period. If St denotes the value of the outside equity then dt is defined by:
12
St = dt + βαϕEt[Vt+1] = αϕVt (7)
⇐⇒ dt + βαϕEt[Vt+1] = αϕpit + αϕβEt[Vt+1] ⇐⇒ dt = αϕpit (8)
11Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) report that CFOs view compensation motivation as a
second-order factor, at best, for smoothing earnings.
12It is not strictly necessary that all income is paid out each period. For example, if reported
income earns the risk-free rate of return within the firm (e.g. through a high yield cash account) and
is protected from expropriation by insiders, then outsiders do not require income to be paid out (see
Lambrecht and Myers (2011) for a model where the firm borrows and saves at the safe rate).
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Equation (7) can be interpreted as a capital market constraint that requires insiders
to provide an adequate return to outside investors. Graham et al. (2005) provide
convincing evidence of the importance of capital market pressures and how they induce
managers to meet earnings targets at all costs.13
ϕ denotes outsiders’ “nominal” ownership stake. Scaling the nominal ownership
stake by the degree of investor protection α gives outsiders’ “real” ownership state
θ ≡ ϕα. It follows that the payouts to outsiders (dt) and insiders (rt) are respectively
given by θpit and (1 − θ)pit. Income (pit) is calculated net of insiders’ compensation
for effort exerted, and is shared between insiders and outsiders according to their real
ownership stake.14 The following corollary results at once.
Corollary 1 If insiders are paid a competitive wage for their efforts and all sharehold-
ers have symmetric information then insiders adopt the first-best production and effort
levels, and payout to outsiders (insiders) equals a fraction θ (1− θ) of realized income
pit.
2 Asymmetric information
We now add two new ingredients to the model. First, we introduce asymmetric infor-
mation regarding the actual realizations of the stochastic variable xt by assuming that
these are only observed by insiders. All model parameters remain common knowledge,
however. Outsiders also have an unbiased estimate xˆ0 of the initial value x0.
15
Second, outsiders observe the output level qt with some measurement error. Instead
of observing qt, insiders observe st ≡ qt + t where t is an i.i.d. normally distributed
noise term with zero mean and variance R (i.e., t ∼ N(0, R)). The measurement
13As one surveyed manager put it:“I miss the target, I’m out of a job.” The perception of outside
investors is such that if insiders cannot “find the money” to hit the earnings target then the firm is
in serious trouble.
14The amount of effort exerted can be inferred from xt or qt.
15xˆ0 is revealed to outside investors when the firm is set up at time zero. See section 3.3 for further
details.
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error is uncorrelated with the marginal cost variable xt (i.e., E(wkl) = 0 for all k
and l). In what follows we refer to st as the firm’s “sales” as perceived by outsiders,
i.e., outsiders perceive the firm’s revenues to be st, whereas in reality they are qt.
16
Outsiders are aware that sales are an imperfect proxy for economic output and they
know the distribution from which t is drawn. Importantly, insiders implement effort
(et) and output (qt) after the realization of xt but before the realization of t is known.
Since t is value-irrelevant noise, the firm’s actual income is still given by pit = qt −
q2t
2xt
− 1
2
ce2t . However, as qt, xt and et are unobservable outsiders have to estimate
income on the basis of noisy sales figures. Therefore measurement errors can lead to
misvaluation in the firm’s stock price.
We know from previous section that there is a mapping from the latent variable xt
to both qt and pit. The presence of the noise term t obscures, however, this link and
makes it impossible for outsiders exactly to infer xt and pit from sales. (Recall that
insiders know xt but not t when setting output qt and effort et.)
Assuming that insiders cannot trade in the firm’s stock and that the information
asymmetry cannot be mitigated through monitoring or some other mechanism (we
return to this in section 3.2), the best outsiders can do is to calculate a probability
distribution of income, pit, on the basis of all information available to them. This
information set It is given by the full history of current and past sales prices, i.e.,
It ≡ {st , st−1 , st−2 ...}. In particular, we show that on the basis of the initial estimate
xˆ0 and the sales history, It, outsiders can infer a probability distribution for the latent
marginal cost variable xt, which in turn maps into a probability distribution for income
pit.
Formally, the outsiders obtain an estimator xˆt for xt using a Kalman filter. The
estimator xˆt depends in general not only on the latest sales figure st but on the entire
available history It of sales. However, since past sales figures become “stale” with time
and therefore less reliable to infer the current level of xt, the Kalman filter resolves
the problem by calculating a weighted average of sales where more recent sales carry
a higher weight. The Kalman estimate xˆt is unbiased (see Chui and Chen (1991) page
40): xˆt = E[xt|It] ≡ ES,t[xt] for all t, where the subscript S in ES,t[xt] emphasizes
16For further details on the sources and properties of measurement errors we refer to the extensive
literature on income measurement in economics, accounting and statistics (see Beaver (1979), Demski
and Sappington (1990) and Moore, Stinson, and Welniak (2000), among others).
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(outside) shareholders’ expectation at time t of xt based on the information set It. The
Kalman filter is also optimal (“best”) in the sense that it minimizes the mean square
error (see Gelb (1974)).17 We focus on the steady state or “limiting” Kalman filter
which results if the history of sales It is sufficiently long.
18 The steady-state Kalman
filter allows us to analyze the long-run behavior of reported income and payout.
One might think that the amount of information to keep track of becomes unman-
ageable as the sales history becomes longer. Fortunately, this is not the case because
the Kalman filter works recursively and only requires previous period’s best estimate
xˆt−1 and current sales st to calculate a new estimate xˆt. The past history of sales is
therefore encapsulated in previous period’s estimate of the latent variable. The new
best estimate xˆt is a weighted average of xˆt−1 and st. The most weight is given to the
number that carries the least uncertainty (similar to Bayesian updating). xˆt−1 is, in
turn, a weighted average of st−1 and xˆt−2. This recursive algorithm works all the way
back to the initial time t = 0, at which point we need the initial estimate xˆ0 for x0 to
start the algorithm.
We can show that with asymmetric information actual income is still linear in
xt under the insiders’ optimal production policy. Hence, using their best, unbiased
estimate xˆt, outsiders can calculate the best, unbiased estimate pˆit of the firm’s income
(i.e., pˆit = ES,t[pit]). It is rational for outside shareholders to demand a payout dt
that equals dt = θES,t(pit) where ES,t(pit) ≡ E [pit|st, st−1, st−2, ...]. Indeed, the capital
market constraint requires that dt satisfies the following constraint:
St = dt + βϕαES,t[Vt+1] = ϕαES,t[Vt]
⇐⇒ dt + βϕαES,t[Vt+1] = ϕαES,t[pit] + ϕαβES,t[Vt+1] ⇐⇒ dt = θES,t[pit]
In other words, outsiders want their share of the income they believe has been realized
according to all information available to them.
While insiders cannot manage outsiders’ expectations through words (which are not
credible) they can do so through their actions. Managers can influence observable sales
17If the disturbances (t and wt) and the initial state (x0) are normally distributed then the Kalman
filter is unbiased. When the normality assumption is dropped unbiasedness may no longer hold, but
the Kalman filter still minimizes the mean square error within the class of all linear estimators.
18Under mild conditions (see appendix) the Kalman filter converges to its steady state. Convergence
is of geometric order and therefore fast.
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(st) by their effort (et) and chosen output level (qt). For example, a lower marginal cost
(as reflected by a higher xt) gives managers an incentive to raise output, which in turn
leads, on average, to higher sales. However, this information conveying mechanism is
partially obscured by the noise term t. As a result, it is not optimal for outsiders to
base their expectations about pit merely on st. Instead, a more accurate estimate can
be obtained by using a Kalman filter that calculates pit on the basis of the firm’s sales
history, It.
Insiders’ optimization problem can now be formulated as follows:
Mt = max
qt+j ,et+j ;j=0..∞
Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
βj (pi(qt+j, et+j) − θES,t+j [pi (qt+j, et+j)])
]
(9)
where pi(qt+j, et+j) ≡ qt+j − 12
q2t+j
xt+j
− 1
2
ce2t+j. Solving this problem gives the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 The insiders’ optimal production plan and effort level are given by:
qt = H xt = Hq
o
t and et =
H2B
2c(1− βA) = H
2 eo ≡ e for all t (10)
Payout to outside shareholders equals a fraction θ of reported income: dt = θpˆit where
pˆit =
(
H − H
2
2
)
xˆt − 1
2
ce2 , (11)
and where xˆt = (Axˆt−1 + Bet)λ + K st (12)
=
λBe
1− λA + K
∞∑
j=0
(λA)jst−j . (13)
H is the positive root to the equation:
f(H) ≡ H2K(θ
2
− βA) +H [βA(1 +K)− 1− θK] + 1− βA = 0 (14)
with K ≡ HP
H2P+R
, λ ≡ (1−KH) and P is the positive root of the equation:
P = A2P − A
2H2P 2
H2P +R
+ Q . (15)
The error of outsiders’ income estimate (pit − pˆit) is normally distributed with mean
zero (i.e., ES,t[pit − pˆit] = 0) and variance σˆ2 ≡ ES,t[(pit − pˆit)2] =
(
H − H2
2
)2
P .
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The proposition describes a rational expectations equilibrium where outsiders infer an
estimate pˆit = ES,t[pit|It] for current income pit on the basis of It, the history of current
and past sales. Insiders take this expectation building mechanism as given. When
setting qt and et insiders know their choice will affect sales and therefore outsiders’
expectations of current and future income. A rational expectations equilibrium is
obtained by ensuring that insiders’ optimal production and effort policy is consistent
each period with the way outsiders form their expectations about income. In other
words, outsiders’ expectations are rational given insiders’ effort and output policy, and
insiders’ effort and output policy are optimal given outsiders’ expectations.
Since st = qt + t the proposition implies that sales are an imperfect (noisy)
measure of the latent variable xt, as is clear from the following “measurement equation”:
st = H xt + t with t ∼ N(0, R) (16)
Outsiders know the variance R of the noise, t, and the parameters A, B and Q of the
“state equation”:
xt = Axt−1 + B et + wt−1 with wt ∼ N(0, Q) for all t (17)
Using the Kalman filter (see appendix), the measurement equation can be combined
with the state equation to make inferences about xt on the basis of current and past
observations of st. This allows outsiders to form an estimate of actual income pit.
The proposition is formulated in terms of the steady state or “limiting” Kalman
filter. One can show (see appendix) that the steady state estimator for xt is given by:
xˆt ≡ ESt[xt] = (Axˆt−1 +B e)λ + Kst (18)
where λ and K are as defined in the proposition. K is called the “Kalman gain” and
it plays a crucial role in the updating process. In the absence of measurement errors
xt can be inferred with perfect precision because xˆt = Kst = st/H if R = 0.
Substituting xˆt−1 in (18) by its estimate, one obtains after repeated substitution:
xˆt = Beλ
[
1 + λA+ λ2A2 + λ3A3 + ...
]
+ K
[
st + λAst−1 + λ2A2st−2 + λ3A3st−3 + ...
]
=
Beλ
1− λA + K
∞∑
j=0
λjAjst−j . (19)
Thus, outsiders’ estimate of current actual income is not only determined by their
observation of current sales but also by the whole history of past sales. The weight
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KλjAj that is put on past sales levels declines, however, with time because λA < 1.
The important implication is that the insiders’ optimization problem is no longer static
in nature but inter-temporal and dynamic. Indeed, the current production decision not
only affects insiders’ current expected income but also all future income.
2.1 Production and Effort Policy
Consider next the firm’s output and effort policy. We know from Proposition 2 that
insiders’ optimal production and effort policies are given by, respectively, qt = H xt
and et = H
2 eo, where H is the solution to equation (14). There exists a unique
positive (real) root for H which lies in the interval [0, 1].19 We therefore obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 2 If outsiders indirectly infer income from sales (st) then insiders under-
produce (i.e., qt = Hxt = Hq
o
t ≤ q0t ) and under-invest in effort (i.e., et = H2 eo ≤
eo).
Insiders underproduce because outsiders do not observe xt directly but estimate its
value indirectly from sales. This gives insiders an incentive to manipulate sales (engage
in “signal-jamming”) in an attempt to “fool” outsiders. In particular, insiders trade
off the benefit from lowering outsiders’ expectations about income against the cost of
underproduction. From Proposition 2 it follows that a marginal decrease in current
output (and therefore expected sales) lowers outsiders’ beliefs about current income
by
(
H − H2
2
)
K, and about income j periods from now by
(
H − H2
2
)
K(λA)j. At
the first-best output level insiders’ expected marginal change in realized income from
cutting output is zero (since ∂Et−1[pit]
∂qt
= 0 at qot ).
20 Therefore, a marginal cut in output
benefits insiders. Insiders keep cutting output up to the point where the marginal
19Indeed f(0) = −1 + βA < 0 and f(1) = θK2 ≥ 0. Since θ, A, λ and β all fall in the
[0, 1] interval, an exhaustive numerical grid evaluation can be executed for all possible parameter
combinations. Numerical checks reveal that H is the unique positive root.
20Et−1[pit] denotes insiders’ expectation of pit on the basis of the information available at t − 1.
The expectation is taken with respect to t only, because wt−1 (and therefore xt) is known to insiders
when they implement qt and et.
15
cost of cutting (in terms of realized income) equals the marginal benefit (in terms of
lowering outsiders’ expectations).21
Underproduction translates into too low effort. The production inefficiency mag-
nifies the effect of asymmetric information on effort because the production coefficient
H is squared, i.e., et = H
2 eo. The direct, instantaneous adverse effect of asymmetric
information is therefore more severe on effort than on output. This comparison ignores,
however, the indirect, inter-temporal negative feedback of effort on output. Since out-
put depends on the level of xt, and since less effort feeds back into xt over time, lack of
effort further undermines production over time. Suppose, for example, we start from a
level xt−1. Under the first-best and actual policies for production and effort the values
for qot and qt are, respectively:
qot = 1 [Axt−1 + B e
o + wt−1] + t , and (20)
qt = H
[
Axt−1 + BH2 eo + wt−1
]
+ t . (21)
Therefore:
qot − qt = (Axt−1 + wt−1) (1−H) + Beo
(
1−H3) . (22)
The negative feedback from suboptimal effort into production over one period equals
Beo (1−H3). The unconditional long-run mean for qt under the first-best and actual
effort policies are, respectively, E[qot ] = E[x
o
t ] = Be
o/(1−A) and E[qt] = HE[xt] =
BH3 eo/(1−A). Given that H enters in a cubic fashion, the total (instantaneous plus
intertemporal) loss in output is therefore substantial (see the discussion of figure 1
below for further details). Lost output, in turn, translates into a loss of income. The
unconditional mean income under the first-best and actual production policies are,
respectively, given by E[piot ] =
1
2
(
E[xot ] − ceo2
)
and E[pit] =
(
H − H2
2
)
E[xt]− 12cet2.
21Note that outsiders are not fooled by insiders’ signal-jamming. Outsiders correctly anticipate this
manipulation and incorporate it into their expectations. In spite of being unable to fool outsiders,
insiders are “trapped” into behaving myopically. The situation is analogous to what happens in a
prisoner’s dilemma. The preferred cooperative equilibrium would be efficient production by insiders
and no conjecture of manipulation by outsiders. This can, however, not be sustained as a Nash
equilibrium because insiders have an incentive to underproduce whenever outsiders believe the efficient
production policy is being adopted (see e.g. Stein (1989) for further details; a similar type of signal-
jamming equilibrium is also described in different contexts by Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Gal-Or
(1987), among others).
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Interestingly, the noisier the link between sales and the latent cost variable, the
less outsiders can infer from sales. This reduces insiders’ incentives to underproduce.
The link between st and xt can become noisier for two reasons. First, an increase in
the variance of the transitory measurement errors obviously obscures the link between
st and xt. Second, a decrease in the variance of the latent cost variable also weakens
this link, because the measurement errors become larger relative to the variance of the
latent cost variable. This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 3 The noisier the link between the latent variable (xt) and its observable
proxy (st), the weaker insiders’ incentive to manipulate the proxy by underproducing. In
particular, insiders’ production and effort decisions converge to the first-best ones as the
variance of measurement errors becomes infinitely large (R → ∞) and as uncertainty
with respect to the latent variable xt decreases (Q→ 0), i.e., limQ→0H = limR→∞H =
1 and limQ→0 et = limR→∞ et = eo. Conversely, the more precise the link between st
and xt, the higher the incentive to underproduce. The lower bound for H and et is
achieved for the limiting cases Q → ∞ and R → 0, i.e., limQ→∞H = limR→0H =
1− θ
2−θ and limQ→∞ et = limR→0 et =
(
1− θ
2−θ
)2
eo.
When xt becomes deterministic (Q = 0) then the estimation error with respect to xt,
goes to zero (i.e., P → 0). This means that the Kalman gain coefficient K becomes
zero too (there is no learning). But if there is no learning (K = 0 and λ = 1) then
insiders’ output decision qt no longer affects outsiders’ estimate of the cost variable, as
illustrated by equation (19). As a result the production policy becomes efficient (i.e.,
H = 1 and qt = xt), which leads to the efficient level of effort (et = H
2eo = eo).
Similarly, if there are measurement errors then the link between sales and the latent
cost variable becomes noisy. This mitigates the under-investment problem, because
the noise “obscures” or “hides” insiders’ actions and therefore their incentive to cut
production. Specifically, when the variance of the noise becomes infinitely large (R→
∞) then we get the efficient outcome (H = 1). The reason is that sales become
such a noisy measure of actual output that outsiders cannot learn anything about the
realization of the latent cost variable (i.e., K = 0 and λ = 1). This, in turn, cuts the
link between the current output decision and outsiders’ expectation about current and
future income. This leads to the surprising result that less informative output (and
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therefore less informative income) encourage insiders to act more efficiently.
In the absence of measurement errors (R = 0) the link between sales st and the con-
temporaneous level of the latent variable xt becomes deterministic.
22 Outsiders know
for sure that an increase in sales results from a fall in marginal costs. Therefore, when
observing higher sales, outsiders want higher payout. In an attempt to “manage” out-
siders’ expectations downwards, insiders underproduce. We get the efficient outcome
(H = 1) only if insiders get all the income (θ = 0); otherwise we get under-investment
(H < 1). As the insiders’ stake of income goes to zero (θ → 1) also production and
effort go to zero (i.e., H → 0). This result is in sharp contrast with the symmetric
information case where the efficient outcome is obtained no matter how small the in-
siders’ share of the income. Furthermore, since H = 0 and since t ∼ N(0, 0), it follows
that sales, output and effort become zero, i.e., st = Hxt + t = 0 and et = 0. In
other words, insiders put in zero effort and the firm stops producing altogether. Both
outsiders and insiders get nothing, even though the firm could be highly profitable!23
This result shows that for firms where insiders have a very small ownership stake
(e.g. public firms with a highly dispersed ownership structure) asymmetric information
and the resulting indirect inference-making process by outsiders could undermine the
firm’s very existence. We return to this issue and its solution in section 3.
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of the key model parameters (R,Q,A and θ) on
production efficiency.24 Efficiency is measured with respect to 3 different variables:
effort (et), the unconditional mean output (E[qt]), and unconditional mean income
(E[pit]). The degree of efficiency is determined by comparing the actual outcome with
the first-best outcome, i.e., et/e
o (solid line), E[qt]/E[q
o
t ] (dashed line), and E[pit]/E[pi
o
t ]
22For R = 0 we get P = Q, K = 1/H and λ = 0. Therefore, from Proposition 2 it follows that
xˆt = st/H and st = Hxt. Consequently, xˆt = xt.
23Formally, to analyze the behavior of H for R = 0 as a function of θ, we calculate:
∂H
∂θ
= − 2
(2− θ)2 < 0 and
∂2H
∂θ2
= − 4
(2− θ)3 < 0 (23)
It follows that H is a concave declining function of θ when R = 0. In other words, H declines at
an increasing rate. This implies that the production and effort policies become more inefficient at an
increasing rate as insiders’ ownership stake is eroded.
24The baseline parameter values used to generate all the figures in this paper are: A = 0.8, B = 1,
c = 1, Q = 4, R = 1, β = 0.95 and θ = 0.8.
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(dotted line).
The figure shows that the efficiency loss is always largest with respect to output
and smallest with respect to effort, with income falling in between because the loss in
revenues is to some extent offset by lower costs of effort and production. Panel A and
B confirm that full efficiency is achieved as R moves towards∞ and for Q = 0. Panel C
shows that a higher autocorrelation in marginal costs substantially reduces efficiency
because it allows outsiders to infer more information about the latent cost variable
from sales and therefore gives insiders stronger incentives to distort production.
Finally, panel D shows that production is fully efficient if outsiders have no stake in
the firm’s income (i.e., θ = 0). Efficiency severely declines as outsiders’ stake increases.
For θ = 1, insiders have no real ownership stake in the firm but they are still expected
to determine production policy and to pay out the expected income. We know from
our earlier analysis that insiders stop producing altogether if sales are fully informative
(i.e., H = 0 if R = 0 or Q =∞). However, if sales are not fully informative (as is the
case for our benchmark parameter values), then this leaves some scope for insiders to
“hide” their actions. Insiders therefore still benefit to some degree by putting in a bit
of effort. For our baseline parameter values insiders’ incentives are seriously eroded as
they put in only 13% of the first-best effort level and achieve only 5% of the first-best
output level for θ = 1. However, one can show that as Q/R → 0 incentives are fully
restored, and the first-best outcome can be achieved even for θ = 1. This confirms
that the root cause of underproduction is the process of indirect inference and not the
outside ownership stake per se. The firm’s ownership structure serves, however, as a
transmission mechanism through which inefficiencies can be amplified.
2.2 The time-series properties of income
Proposition 2 also allows us to derive the time-series properties of income:
Proposition 3 The firm’s “actual income” is:
pit = hxt − 1
2
c e2. (24)
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The firm’s “reported income” is described by the following target adjustment model.
pˆit = ES,t[pit] = hxˆt − 1
2
c e2 (25)
= pˆit−1 + (1− λA) (pi∗t − pˆit−1) (26)
= λApˆit−1 + KH
(
1− H
2
)
st + k ≡ γˆ0 + γˆ1 st + γˆ2pˆit−1 . (27)
The “income target” pi∗t is given by:
pi∗t =
k
1− λA +
(
KH
1− λA
)(
1− H
2
)
st ≡ γ∗0 + γ∗1 st . (28)
where k ≡ hλBe − 1
2
ce2 (1− λA) and where h ≡
(
H − H2
2
)
. The speed of adjustment
coefficient is given by SOA ≡ (1− λA) with 0 < SOA ≤ 1.
The proposition characterizes three types of income: the “income target” (pi∗t ), “re-
ported income” (pˆit) and “actual income” (pit). Reported income follows a target that is
determined by the contemporaneous level of sales. However, as equation (26) shows, the
reported income only gradually adjusts to changes in sales because the SOA coefficient
(1− λA) is less than unity. This leads to income smoothing in the sense that the effect
on reported income of a shock to sales is distributed over time. In particular, a dollar in-
crease in sales leads to an immediate increase in reported income of only
(
H − H2
2
)
K.
The lagged incremental effects in subsequent periods are given by
(
H − H2
2
)
KλA,(
H − H2
2
)
K(λA)2,
(
H − H2
2
)
K(λA)3,... The long-run effect of a dollar increase in
sales on reported income equals
(
H − H2
2
)
K
∑∞
j=0 (λA)
j =
(
H−H2
2
)
K
1−λA , which is the
slope coefficient γ∗1 of the income target pi
∗
t (see equation (28)). In contrast, with sym-
metric information, the impact of a shock to sales is fully impounded into reported
income immediately.
Our model for reported income can also be expressed as a distributed lag model
in which reported income is a function of current and past sales. Indeed, repeated
backward substitution of equation (27) gives:
pˆit =
k
1− λA + Kh
∞∑
j=0
(λA)j st−j . (29)
Given that (i) reported income is smooth relative to actual income and (ii) payout is
based on reported income, it follows that insiders soak up the variation. We return to
this issue in Section 2.4, where we discuss payout.
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2.3 Income smoothing
We now consider the smoothing mechanism in more detail. Our model identifies two
types of shocks: value-irrelevant transitory measurement errors (t) and value-relevant
persistent shocks to marginal costs (wt). We now explore in turn the effect of each
type of shock on the various income measures.
2.3.1 Transitory measurement errors
The following corollary summarizes the effects of measurement errors.
Corollary 4 Measurement errors create asymmetric information, which in turn leads
to smoothing of reported income. The effect of a measurement error t on actual income
(pit), reported income (pˆit) and the income target (pi
∗
t ) is as follows:
∂pit+j
∂t
= 0 for all j ≥ 0 (30)
∂pˆit+j
∂t
= Kh (λA)j for all j ≥ 0 (31)
∂pi∗t+j
∂t
=
Khδj
1− λA where δj = 1 if j = 0 and δj = 0 if j > 0 (32)
∞∑
j=0
∂pi∗t+j
∂
=
∂pi∗t
∂t
=
Kh
1− λA =
∞∑
j=0
∂pˆit+j
∂t
(33)
Measurement errors are not value-relevant and therefore do not affect actual income
(i.e.,
∂pit+j
∂t
= 0). Measurement errors do affect outsiders’ beliefs about income and
therefore also reported income. Their effect is, however, distributed over time, i.e.,
reported income smooths out transitory measurement errors. In contrast, the income
target instantaneously impounds the aggregate effect of measurement errors (i.e.,
∂pi∗t
∂t
=∑∞
j=0
∂pˆit+j
∂t
). Since measurement errors are value-irrelevant noise and merely affect
current sales there is no reason why they should affect future income targets. The
presence of measurement errors (and therefore asymmetric information) is a necessary
condition to have income smoothing.25
25Formally, λ ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ R ≥ 0. If R = 0 then SOA = 1 and reported income fully adjust each
period to the target. Full adjustment also occurs if the marginal cost variable is uncorrelated, even
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2.3.2 Persistent shocks to marginal costs.
The following corollary summarizes the effects of persistent shocks to the marginal cost
variable xt.
Corollary 5 The effect of a persistent shock wt−1 in the latent cost variable on actual
income (pit), reported income (pˆit) and the income target (pi
∗
t ) is as follows:
∂pit+j
∂wt−1
= hAj (34)
∂pˆit+j
∂wt−1
=
KhHAj(1− λj+1)
(1− λ) (35)
∂pi∗t+j
∂wt−1
=
(
KH
1− λA
)
hAj (36)
∞∑
j=0
∂pi∗t+j
∂wt−1
=
KHh
(1− λA)(1− A) =
∞∑
j=0
∂pˆit+j
∂wt−1
(37)
A persistent shock to income arises from a shock to the firm’s marginal cost of produc-
tion, and affects both contemporaneous and future income (
∂pit+j
∂wt−1
= hAj) because the
marginal cost variable is autoregressive (A > 0). The cumulative effect on actual in-
come of a persistent shock equals
∑∞
j=0
∂pit+j
∂wt−1
= h
1−A . In terms of targets, a persistent
shock affects all future income targets due to the autoregressive nature of marginal
production costs. And, with regard to reported income, the effect of a persistent shock
is smoothed over time because in the short run outsiders cannot distinguish between
measurement error and shocks to the latent cost variable. As time passes, it becomes
gradually clear whether a shock in sales was due to measurement error or a change
in the latent marginal cost variable. Therefore, the total aggregate effect on reported
income adds up to the total effect on the income target. In other words, although
reported income initially adjust more slowly than the income target, reported income
“catches up” eventually so that over the long run it impounds the full aggregate effect.
The SOA to the income target decreases as Q, the variance of persistent shocks
wt, decreases. As Q → 0, K converges to 0, and therefore λ converges to 1, and
SOA→ 1−A. From Proposition 3, it follows that reported income no longer depend
if there is transitory noise (i.e., SOA = 1 if A = 0). And, when the variance of measurement errors
becomes infinite, the SOA converges to 1−A.
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on sales. In other words, outsiders do not learn from sales because the dynamic behavior
of the latent cost variable is deterministic and fully known to outsiders.
2.3.3 The effect of information asymmetry on income smoothing
Corollary 6 A lower degree of information asymmetry (i.e., R falls relative to Q)
leads to less smoothing. In the limit (i.e., R = 0 or Q→∞) both reported income and
target income coincide with actual income at all times (i.e., pit = pˆit = pi
∗
t for all t).
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No smoothing whatsoever occurs when R = 0 because in that case all information
asymmetry is eliminated. In the absence of measurement errors, it is possible to infer
the marginal cost variable xt with 100% accuracy from the observed sales figure st.
The same result obtains when Q → ∞ because in that case measurement errors are
negligibly small compared to the variance of the latent cost variable. This important
result confirms again that asymmetric information and not uncertainty per se is the
root cause of income smoothing.
The corollary also confirms that as the degree of information asymmetry goes to
zero, our rational expectations equilibrium converges to the simple sharing rule that
prevails under symmetric information. Indeed: limR→0 dt = θ limR→0 pˆit = θpit.
Consider now the other polar case where sales are extremely noisy measures of the
latent cost variable (i.e., R → +∞). One can verify that reported income now evolve
according to an AR(1) process:
pˆit = Apˆit−1 +
Be
2
− 1
2
ce2(1− A) (38)
Therefore, in this case, reported income evolves according to the (expected value of
the) AR(1) process for the latent cost variable. Sales no longer provide any additional
information and measurement errors no longer affect reported income.
A similar result applies when the process for the latent cost variable becomes deter-
ministic (Q = 0). One can verify that in that case the process for reported income is
26For R = 0 we obtain K = 1/H and λ = 0, and as a result, we get γˆ1 = γ
∗
1 = − 12ce2 and
γˆ0 st = γ
∗
1 st = hxt, and therefore pit = pˆit = pi
∗
t .
23
again described by (38). Since xt is deterministic, its evolution can be described with
100% accuracy. Sales again become irrelevant towards determining reported income
and, as a result, measurement errors play no role. This leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 7 If measurement errors become extremely large (R = +∞) or if there are
no persistent shocks to the latent cost variable (Q = 0) then reported income behaves
according to (the expected value of) the process for the latent cost variable. Sales figures
do not affect reported income.
2.3.4 Real versus financial smoothing.
Figure 2 illustrates and summarizes the effect of the main model parameters (θ, A,R
and Q) on the speed of adjustment (SOA) of reported income to the income target.
Recall that no smoothing (i.e., SOA = 1) occurs under symmetric information. Our
symmetric information benchmark case corresponds therefore with SOA = 1 (repre-
sented by a solid horizontal line at SOA = 1 in the figure). The dotted line plots
the SOA that results from the actual production policy (as determined by H) derived
under asymmetric information. While this gives us an idea of the total amount of
intertemporal income smoothing, it does not tell us how much of this is due to the
suboptimal production policy that results from indirect inference and how much is due
to mere financial smoothing that results from asymmetric information. We refer to the
former as “real” smoothing and to the latter as “financial” smoothing.
The financial smoothing component is measured by evaluating the SOA at the
first-best production policy H = 1, i.e., SOA = 1 − Aλ[H = 1] (as represented by
the dashed line). Therefore Aλ[H = 1] reflects the amount of smoothing that would
take place under asymmetric information but assuming that insiders were to adopt
the efficient production policy. Financial smoothing is therefore measured in figure
2 by the distance between the horizontal solid line at SOA=1 and the dashed line.
Since the dotted line represents the total amount of smoothing (i.e., financial plus
real smoothing), the difference between the dashed line and the dotted line (given by
Aλ− Aλ[H = 1]) captures the amount of “real smoothing”.
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The distinction between the two types of smoothing is clearly illustrated in panel A
which plots the SOAs as a function of the (real) outside ownership stake θ. Changing θ
does not alter the degree of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders and,
as a result, the amount of financial smoothing remains constant. The corresponding
SOA of 0.86 (dashed line) implies a half-life of about 0.35 years for adjustment of
reported income to changes in sales.27 Increasing θ introduces, however, additional
real smoothing and this reduces the SOA from 0.86 (for θ = 0) to 0.56 (for θ = 1)
corresponding, respectively, to a half-life of 0.35 years and 0.84 years. In the latter case
real smoothing adds about half a year to the half-life. The plot confirms our earlier
results that reducing inside ownership leads to severe underproduction, which in turn
leads to a smoother reported income flow because income becomes less sensitive to
sales.
Panel B shows that smoothing also increases with the degree of autocorrelation in
the latent cost variable. No intertemporal smoothing takes place when A = 0 because
in that case current and past realizations of xt are irrelevant for the future. As a result,
insiders’ private information about xt is also irrelevant for the future. Note that higher
autocorrelation raises both real and financial smoothing substantially.
Finally, panels C and D confirm that the total amount of smoothing increases with
the degree of information asymmetry (as reflected by a higher R or lower Q). Para-
doxically, more intertemporal smoothing coincides with higher production efficiency
(see figure 1): when outsiders can infer less from sales, there is also less of an incen-
tive to manipulate production. Note that a higher degree of information asymmetry
unambiguously increases the amount of financial smoothing.
2.4 Payout Policy
Since the payout to outsiders is given by dt = θpˆit, it follows that the firm’s payout
policy to outsiders is described by the target adjustment model for pˆit in (27):
dt = λAdt−1 + θhKst + θk . (39)
27Half-life is the time needed to close the gap between reported income and the income target by
50%, after a one-unit shock to the error term in the target adjustment model for reported income.
When reported income follows an AR(1) process half-life is log(0.5)/ log(1 - SOA).
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The payout model is similar to the well known Lintner (1956) dividend model. The
key difference is that in Lintner (1956) the payout target is determined by the firm’s
net income, whereas in our model the target is a function of sales because net income is
not directly observable by outsiders. Payout in our model is not smoothed relative to
reported income but relative to a proxy variable observable by outsiders, i.e., sales.28
3 Robustness, extensions and discussion
3.1 Forced disclosure and the “big bath”
Insiders’ payout policy guarantees that the capital market constraint is satisfied at all
times, i.e., St ≥ ϕαEt[Vt|It]. But will insiders be willing to adhere to this payout
policy under all circumstances? Insiders’ participation constraint is satisfied if they
are better off paying out than triggering collective action. Collective action implies
that stockholders “open up” the firm and uncover its true value (Vt). It is reasonable
(although not necessary) to assume that collective action also imposes a cost upon
insiders. Graham et al. (2005) report that the consequences of missing an earnings
target can be so serious for managers’ career and reputation that they try to avoid
missing the target at all cost. Without loss of generality assume that these costs are
proportional to the firm value and given by Ct = cVt.
Insiders trigger collective action when outsiders’ beliefs regarding the firm’s value
(and therefore the required payout) are excessively overoptimistic. “Forced disclosure”
by outsiders pricks the bubble that has been building up over time and brings outsiders’
beliefs about the firm value back to reality, i.e., Et[Vt|It] = Vt.
A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for insiders to keep paying out according
28Payout smoothing in the strict Lintner sense could be obtained, for instance, if insiders are risk-
averse and subject to habit formation. Lambrecht and Myers (2011) show that insiders of this type
smooth payout relative to income by borrowing and lending. Introducing debt and cash into our
model would allow risk-averse insiders to borrow against future income or to “park” reported income
onto the firm’s cash account (see also footnote 12).
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to outsiders’ expectations is:
Mt = Vt − ϕαEt[Vt|It] ≥ Vt − ϕαVt − cVt ⇐⇒ Vt ≥ ϕααϕ+c Et[Vt|It] (40)
Outsiders have an incentive to trigger collective action if the firm’s actual value (Vt)
drops sufficiently below below what outsiders believe the firm to be worth (Et[Vt|It]).29
This situation arises if outsiders’ beliefs about the latent cost variable (as reflected by
xˆt) are overoptimistic due to measurement errors.
30
As mentioned before, insiders absorb the variation between actual and reported
income. In particular, each period insiders actually receive (pit − ϕαpˆit) instead of
(1 − ϕα)pit. The net gain (or loss) to insiders is therefore ϕα (pit − pˆit). The net gain
relative to the actual amount received is ϕα(pit − pˆit)/(pit − ϕαpˆit). For a small outside
ownership stake (e.g., private firms) or a low degree of investor protection (α), the gain
or loss that insiders absorb is only a small fraction of the income stream they receive.
However, as ϕ→ 1 and α→ 1, these gains pit − pˆit constitute 100% of insiders’ income.
How can one reduce the likelihood of costly forced disclosure? Since a lower nominal
outside ownership stake (ϕ) and a lower degree of investor protection (α) relax insid-
ers’ participation constraint, one obvious solution is to reduce either of these two (or
a combination of both).31 Unfortunately, this also reduces the firm’s capacity to raise
outside equity. Therefore, firms that rely heavily on outside equity (e.g. public firms)
adopt more efficient (in terms of cost and speed) disclosure mechanisms such as volun-
tary audited disclosure. While “big baths” do occur in reality, they rarely result from a
very costly forced disclosure process but they are much more likely to happen through
the process of regular voluntary audited disclosures.32 As we show below, high quality
audited disclosures keep misvaluations within bounds and resolve the need for insiders
29Calculating the exact condition under which insiders optimally exercise their option to trigger
collective action is beyond the scope of this paper.
30Note that measurement errors as such do not jeopardize the actual economic viability of the firm
because measurement errors are value-irrelevant (even though they can induce temporary misvalu-
ations in the firm’s stock price). Therefore, in our model a “big bath” would never coincide with
bankruptcy or actual abandonment by insiders because actual firm value is always strictly positive in
our model.
31Non-pecuniary private benefits of control may also play a role in keeping insiders on board.
32One important exception is the case of deliberate fraud which, by its very nature, often requires
legal investigative teams with special powers to uncover the truth.
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to trigger collective action and force disclosure. Still, in many countries with weak gov-
ernance, reliable accounting information may not be available and outsiders’ property
rights may be hard to enforce, explaining the widespread phenomenon of family firms
with a high insider ownership stake and a low degree of investor protection.
3.2 Audited disclosure and ownership structure
Our analysis in section 2 showed that the firm’s effort and production policy become
increasingly more inefficient as insiders’ real ownership stake (1− ϕα) decreases. This
could pose serious problems for public firms, which often have a small inside equity
base and a large number of highly dispersed outside shareholders. Our model predicts
that under-investment could become so severe that firms stop producing altogether,
even if they are inherently profitable.
It may therefore come as no surprise that mechanisms have been developed to
reduce the degree of information asymmetry. In particular, publicly traded companies
(unlike private firms) are subject to stringent disclosure requirements.33 The traditional
argument put forward to justify disclosure is often that of investor protection. The
general underlying idea is that outside investors need to be protected from fraud or
conflicts of interests by insiders (usually managers). Audited disclosure is generally
believed to benefit outsiders by curtailing insiders’ ability to exploit their informational
advantage and to extract informational rents.
Our paper shows that the case for audited accounting information rests not only
on investor protection. Our model shows that asymmetric information is problematic
even if insider trading is precluded and outsiders’ property rights are 100% guaranteed
(i.e., α = 1). Moreover, disclosure is not necessarily a win/lose situation for out-
siders/insiders. In our setting, eliminating information asymmetry would be welcomed
by outsiders and insiders alike. In other words, disclosure (assuming it can be achieved
in a relatively costless fashion) is a win-win situation for all parties involved.
33While a private firm has no requirement publicly to disclose much, if any, financial information,
public firms are required to submit an annual form (Form 10-K in the United States, for instance)
giving comprehensive detail of the company’s performance. Public firms are also required to spend
more on independent, certified public accountants and they are subject to much more laws and
regulations (such as the Securities Act of 1933 and the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S.).
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Formally, in proposition 2 we showed that, on the basis of current and past sales,
outsiders calculate an income estimate pˆit. The error of outsiders’ estimate, pit − pˆit, is
normally distributed with zero mean and variance σˆ2. Suppose now that, in addition
to the sales data, auditors provide each period an independent estimate yt of income
where yt ∼ N(pit, σ2). Importantly, auditors provide their assessment after t and wt−1
are realized. The auditors’ estimate is unbiased (i.e., Et[yt] = pit)
34 but subject to some
random error (yt− pit). Insiders nor auditors have control over the error, and the error
is independent across periods. In summary, on the basis of the full sales history It
outsiders construct a prior distribution of current income that is given by N(pˆit, σˆ
2).
Auditors then provide an independent estimate yt, which outsiders know is drawn from
a distribution N(pit, σ
2).
Using simple Bayesian updating, it follows that the outsiders’ estimate of income
conditional on yt and on the sales history It is given by:
35
κyt + (1− κ)pit where κ = σˆ
2
σˆ2 + σ2
. (41)
The parameter κ can be interpreted as a parameter that reflects the quality of the
additional information provided. A value of κ close to 0 means that the audited
disclosure is highly unreliable and carries little weight in influencing outsiders’ beliefs
about income.
How does the provision of information by independent auditors influence insiders’
decisions? Insiders’ optimization problem can now be formulated as:
Mt = max
qt+j ,et+j ;j=0..∞
Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
βj (pi(qt+j, et+j) − ϕακEt+j(yt+j) − ϕα(1− κ)ES,t+j [pi (qt+j, et+j)])
]
= max
qt+j ,et+j ;j=0..∞
Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
βj (pi(qt+j, et+j) (1− ϕακ) − ϕα(1− κ)ES,t+j [pi (qt+j, et+j)])
]
= (1− ϕακ) max
qt+j ,et+j ;j=0..∞
Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
βj (pi(qt+j, et+j) − G(ϕ, α, θ)ES,t+j [pi (qt+j, et+j)])
]
(42)
34This assumption is not strictly necessary. For example, if auditors are, say, conservative then the
analysis would remain similar provided that outsiders know the auditors’ bias.
35It might be possible for outsiders to refine the estimate of the latent cost variable xt by using the
entire history of auditors’ income estimates. We ignore this possibility, and assume that all relevant
accounting information is encapsulated in the auditors’ most recent income estimate.
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where G(ϕ, α, κ) ≡ ϕα(1−κ)
1−ϕακ ≡ θ(1−κ)1−θκ , and where we made use of the fact that the
auditors’ estimate is unbiased at all times, i.e., Et+j[yt+j] = pi(qt+j, et+j) for all j,
irrespective of insiders’ decision rules for qt+j and et+j. In other words, insiders can-
not distort auditors’ estimate (the release of the accounting information happens by
independent auditors after income are realized).
Comparing the optimization problem (42) with the original one we solved in (9),
one can see that both problems are essentially the same, except for the fact that
the outside ownership parameter θ in (9) has been replaced by the governance index
G(ϕ, α, κ) in (42). This means that the solutions for qt+j and et+j can be obtained by
merely replacing θ by G(ϕ, α, κ) in the solution we previously obtained.
G(ϕ, α, κ) ranges across the [0, 1] interval and can be interpreted as an (inverse)
governance index that crucially depends on the outsiders’ ownership stake (ϕ), the
degree of investor protection (α) and on the quality of audited disclosure (κ). If κ = 0
(i.e., G = θ) then the independently provided accounting information is completely
unreliable and discarded by outsiders. In that case the optimization problem and
its solution coincide exactly with the ones presented in section 2. If κ = 1 (i.e.,
G = 0) then the independently provided accounting information is perfectly reliable.
All information asymmetry is resolved and we get the first-best outcome that was
presented in section 1.
Calculating the comparative statics for G with respect to θ and κ gives:
∂G(θ, κ)
∂θ
=
1− κ
[1− θκ]2 ≥ 0 , and
∂G(θ, κ)
∂κ
=
θ(θ − 1)
[1− θκ]2 ≤ 0 .
It follows that reducing outsiders’ (real) equity stake or increasing the quality of audited
disclosure act in a similar fashion, and these levers are therefore substitutes. The results
are summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 8 Higher quality audited disclosure (κ) improves the firm’s operating effi-
ciency and acts as a substitute for a higher real inside ownership stake (θ).
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3.3 Accounting quality, stock market size and growth
In this section we examine the model’s implications for corporate investment (and
economic growth more generally) by analyzing the initial decision to set up the firm.
Assume that an investment cost E is required to establish the firm at time t =
0. The financing is raised from inside and outside equity. To abstract from adverse
selection issues (see Myers and Majluf (1984)) we assume as before that insiders have
access to an unbiased estimate for x0 at time zero (i.e., xˆ0 = x0). As a result insiders
and outsiders attach the same value V (x0; θ, κ) to the firm when the firm is founded,
as given in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The value of the firm at time t = 0 is given by:
V0(x0; θ, κ) =
h
(1− βA)
(
x0 +
Beβ
1− β
)
− 1
2
ce2
(1− β) (43)
where the values for the production (h ≡ H − H2
2
) and effort (e) policies are obtained
as described in proposition 2 but by replacing θ everywhere by G(θ;κ).
We know that the firm value monotonically declines in the real ownership stake θ(≡
αϕ). Therefore the first-best firm value is achieved when the outside ownership stake
is zero (i.e., θ = 0). Assuming the investment in the firm happens on a now-or-never
basis at t = 0, the first-best investment decision is given by the following criterion:
invest if and only if V (x0; θ = 0, κ) ≥ E. Note that the accounting quality κ does
not influence the investment decision when θ = 0, because without outside investors
audited disclosure becomes superfluous.
Assume next, without loss of generality, that insiders have no money to contribute
and need to raise the full amount E from outsiders. Assume further that the quality
of audited disclosure (κ) is exogenously given, but that the real ownership stake θ can
be chosen.36 The decision problem is therefore to identify the lowest value for θ that
allows insiders to raise enough outside equity, St, to cover the investment cost (i.e.,
S0(x0; θ, κ) = E).
36Outsiders’ nominal ownership stake ϕ is obviously a control variable. The degree of investment
protection α is, initially at least, under control too through the firm’s charter and governance mech-
anisms (such as board composition) that are implemented upon the firm’s foundation.
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Since xˆ0 = x0, the initial inside (M0) and outside (S0) equity are:
M0 = V0(x0; θ, κ)− θES,0 [V0(xˆ0; θ, κ)] = (1− θ)V0(x0; θ, κ) (44)
S0 = θES,0 [V0(xˆ0; θ, κ)] = θV0(x0; θ, κ) (45)
The (constrained) optimal value for θ is therefore the solution to:
θo = min {θ| θV0(x0; θ, κ) = E} (46)
The solution is illustrated in Figure 3. Panel A plots the total firm value V0(x0; θ, κ) as
a function of outsiders’ real ownership θ for three different levels of disclosure quality
(κ). In line with our earlier results, total firm value declines monotonically with respect
to θ. The loss can be substantial: the first-best firm value equals 900 (i.e., for θ = 0),
whereas the firm value under 100% outside ownership equals a mere 150 (i.e., for θ = 1).
High quality audited disclosure (κ = 0.9) can, however, significantly mitigate the value
loss. For example for κ = 0.9 the loss in value appears to be less than 1% for as long
as insiders own a majority stake. In the absence of audited disclosure or when audited
disclosure is completely useless (i.e., κ = 0), significant value losses kick in at much
lower outside ownership levels. For example, at θ = 0.5 about a third of the first-best
value is lost in the absence of audited disclosure.
Panel B shows the total outside equity value as a function of the outside ownership
stake for three different levels of disclosure quality. The curves resemble “outside equity
Laffer curves”.37 The outside equity value θV0(x0; θ, κ) is an inverted U-shaped function
function of θ that reaches a unique maximum. This maximum changes significantly
according to the quality of the audited disclosure, and equals about 650, 420 and 310
for high quality, low quality and no audited disclosure, respectively. No investment
would take place in the absence of audited disclosure, because the amount of outside
equity that can be raised is inadequate to finance the investment cost (which equals
E = 400). Investment would take place in the two case where accounting information
is audited, and about θo = 45% (θo
′
= 55%) of shares would end up in outsiders’ hands
with high (low) quality audited disclosure.
Our results provide theoretical support for a number of empirical studies that have
found a positive link between economic growth, stock market size, stock market capi-
talizations, and quality of accounting information. The standard explanation for this
37The traditional Laffer curve is a graphical representation of the relation between government
revenue raised by taxation and all possible rates of taxation. The curve resembles an inverted U-
shaped function that reaches a maximum at an interior rate of taxation.
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result is that higher quality accounting information provides better investor protection.
While higher investor protection (i.e., higher α) also leads to higher stock market val-
uations in our model, audited disclosure does not as such improve investor protection
in our model. Instead, independent audited disclosure reduces the inefficiencies from
indirect inference because insiders are less concerned about the effect of their actions
on outsiders’ expectations. Our model therefore highlights an important role of inde-
pendent audited disclosure and monitoring that has hitherto not been recognized in
the literature.38 Figure 3 illustrates that the efficiency gains from audited disclosure
can be economically highly significant.
4 Additional empirical implications
Our theory of intertemporal income smoothing yields rich, testable implications for
the time-series properties of reported income and payout to outsiders. Some of these
were outlined in the introductory remarks. Here, we provide some more specific cross-
sectional implications:
First, asymmetric information is the key driver of income smoothing in our model.
Such smoothing implies that reported income follows a target adjustment process.
A testable implication is that, in the cross-section of firms, the speed of adjustment
towards the income target should decrease with the degree of information asymmetry
between inside and outside investors.
Second, asymmetric information and the resulting inference process also lead to
underproduction by firms. Both the degree of underproduction and income smoothing
should increase in the cross-section of firms as outside ownership increases. Therefore,
all else equal, public firms are expected to smooth income more and they suffer more
from under-investment. Kamin and Ronen (1978) and Amihud, Kamin, and Ronen
(1983) show that owner-controlled firms do not smooth as much as manager-controlled
38There is, however, a dark side to monitoring that we ignore in this paper. Burkart, Gromb, and
Panunzi (1997) show that monitoring and tight control by shareholders creates an ex-ante hold-up
threat which reduces managerial initiative and non-contractual investment. A dispersed ownership
structure dilutes the hold-up threat and this gain has to be weighed against the loss in productive
efficiency due to inadequate monitoring and disclosure.
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firms. Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, Mazzola, and Pozza (2011) also provide direct evidence for
this. They find that income smoothing is less likely among family-controlled companies
than non-family-controlled companies in a set of Italian firms. The implication on
under-investment is unique to our model as it implies real smoothing but to the best of
our knowledge, this has not yet been thoroughly tested. There is, however, convincing
survey evidence by Graham et al. (2005) that a large majority of managers are willing
to postpone or forgo positive NPV projects in order to smooth earnings.
Third, since smoother income leads to smoother payout, one would expect, all else
equal, that public firms also smooth payout more than private firms. This implication
is consistent with Roberts and Michaely (2007) who show that private firms smooth
dividends less than their public counterparts.
Fourth, income figures that are independently provided by auditors improve pro-
duction efficiency because it reduces insiders’ incentives to manipulate income through
their production and effort policy. Thus, all else equal higher quality accounting infor-
mation should increase firm productivity, managerial effort, stock market capitaliza-
tion, and, more generally, economic growth (as confirmed, for instance, by Rajan and
Zingales, 1998).
Finally, firms that do not have access to independent and high quality auditors can
issue less outside equity. Our model therefore predicts that inside ownership stakes
should be greater in countries with weaker quality of accounting information, which
appears consistent with the widespread phenomenon of greater private and family firms
in such countries.
5 Related literature
Our paper belongs to a series of papers (Fluck (1998, 1999), Myers (2000), Jin and My-
ers (2006) and Lambrecht and Myers (2007, 2008, 2011)) where insiders make payouts
to avoid collective action by outsiders. With the exception of Jin and Myers (2006)
these papers assume symmetric information between insiders and outsiders. In Jin and
Myers, insiders pay out according to outsiders’ expectations of cashflows and absorb
the variation, as is also the case in our model. Their model differs, however, in a num-
ber of fundamental ways. Insiders do not make any production or effort decisions in Jin
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and Myers. Their cash-flow process is completely exogenous and contains a component
that is only observable to insiders. Outsiders do not learn about the latent component
and, as a result, there is no intertemporal smoothing in their model.
Our model of intertemporal smoothing by a firm’s insiders also provides theoretical
support for the Lintner (1956) model of smooth payout policy. To our knowledge, it
is only the second model to do so after Lambrecht and Myers (2011), who assume a
complete information setting where managers set payout policy and their own com-
pensation, but there is a threat of collective action by shareholders. Risk aversion
and habit formation of managers induces them to smooth rents (and, therefore also
payout) relative to net income. Our model does not explain why payout is smooth
relative to income, but instead explains why income is smooth in the first place. As
such, our model is complementary to the one of Lambrecht and Myers (2011). Impor-
tantly, while risk aversion is a pervasive ingredient in existing papers on income and
payout smoothing, our paper does not rely on risk aversion to generate intertemporal
smoothing.
An early, very comprehensive discussion of the objectives, means and implications
of income smoothing can be found in the book by Ronen and Sadan (1981) (which
includes references to some of the earliest work on the subject). In Lambert (1984)
and Dye (1988) risk-averse managers without access to capital markets want to smooth
the firm’s reported income in order to provide themselves with insurance.39 Fudenberg
and Tirole (1995) develop a model where reported income is paid out as dividends and
where risk-averse managers enjoy private benefits from running the firm but can be
fired after poor performance. They assume that recent income observations are more
informative about the prospects of the firm than older ones. They show that managers
distort reported income to maximize the expected length of their tenure: managers
boost (save) income in bad (good) times.
There are also signaling and information-based models to explain income smooth-
ing. Ronen and Sadan (1981) employ a signaling framework to argue that only firms
with good future prospects smooth earnings because borrowing from the future could
be disastrous to a poorly performing firm when the problem explodes in the near term.
39Models driven by risk-aversion (or limited liability) of managers naturally lead to considering
optimal compensation schemes and how they affect smoothing, but we have excluded this literature
for sake of brevity.
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Trueman and Titman (1988) also argue that managers smooth income to convince
potential debtholders that income has lower volatility in order to reduce the cost of
debt. Smoothing costs arise from higher taxes and auditing costs. Tucker and Zarowin
(2006) provide evidence that the change in the current stock price of higher-smoothing
firms contains more information about their future earnings than does the change in
the stock price of lower-smoothing firms. Our model assumes that there are at least
some limits to perfect signaling and is in this sense complementary to these alternative
explanations for earnings smoothing.40
The rational expectations equilibrium of our model works as follows. Upon ob-
serving higher sales, outsiders want higher payout. In an attempt to “fool” outsiders,
insiders underproduce (resulting in real smoothing). However, outsiders anticipate this,
and therefore in equilibrium insiders do not succeed in their attempt. Nevertheless,
the indirect inference process distorts corporate choices. This informational effect is
similar to the ones discussed (albeit in different economic settings) in Milgrom and
Roberts (1982), Riordan (1985), Gal-Or (1987), Stein (1989), Holmstro¨m (1999), and
more recently Bagnoli and Watts (2010).41 The learning process (which we model as
a filtering problem) and the intertemporal smoothing mechanism are, however, quite
different from existing papers. The inference model we consider is also fundamentally
different from alternative information models in the accounting and financial economics
literature in which a firm’s disclosures are always fully verifiable and the firm simply
chooses whether to disclose or not. Disclosure games (see, for instance, Dye (1985,
1990), and more recently, Acharya, DeMarzo and Kremer (2011)) in which insiders can
40In a slightly different approach to motivating earnings smoothing, Goel and Thakor (2003) develop
a theory in which greater earnings volatility leads to a bigger informational advantage for informed
investors over uninformed investors, so that if sufficiently many current shareholders are uninformed
and may need to trade in the future for liquidity reasons, they want the manager to smooth reported
earnings as much as possible.
41While in our model insiders have an incentive not to raise outsiders’ expectations regarding income,
opposite incentives arise in Bagnoli and Watts (2010) who examine the interaction between product
market competition and financial reporting. They show that Cournot competitors bias their financial
reports so as to create the impression that their production costs are lower than they actually are.
One can think of other considerations that might encourage insiders to inflate income (e.g. if insiders
wanted to issue more stock, acquire a target with a stock offer, or if insiders’ contractual remuneration
increases with reported income) but these are beyond the scope of this paper.
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send imperfect signals and alter production to affect outsiders’ inference could be an
interesting avenue for future research.
6 Conclusion
The theory of income smoothing developed in this paper assumes that (i) insiders have
information about income that outside shareholders do not, but (ii) outsiders are en-
dowed with property rights that enables them to take collective action against insiders
if they do not receive a fair payout that meets their expectations. We showed that
insiders report income consistent with outsiders’ expectations based on available in-
formation rather than the true income. This gave rise to a theory of inter-temporal
smoothing – both real and financial – in which observed income and payout adjust
partially and over time towards a target and insiders under-invest in production and
effort. The primary friction driving the smoothing is information asymmetry as in-
siders are averse to choosing actions that would unduly raise outsiders’ expectations
about future income. Interestingly, this problem is more severe the smaller is the inside
ownership and thus should be a greater hindrance to the functioning of publicly (or
dispersedly) owned firms. We show that the firm’s outside equity value is an inverted
U-shaped function of outsiders’ ownership stake. This “outside equity Laffer curve”
shows that the under-investment problem severely limits the firm’s capacity to raise
outside equity. However, a disclosure environment with adequate quality of indepen-
dent auditing can help mitigate the problem, leading to the conclusion that accounting
quality can enhance investments, size of public stock markets and economic growth.
While our theory of inter-temporal smoothing of income and payout conforms to
several existing findings (such as the Lintner (1956) model of payout policy), it also
leads to a range of testable empirical implications in the cross-section of firms as in-
formation asymmetry and ownership structure are varied. These are worthy of further
investigation. It would also be fruitful to apply our framework to other corporate con-
texts so as to investigate the role of capital structure (debt versus equity) in addressing
income smoothing as well as to study how alternative managerial objectives such as
myopia further affect smoothing outcomes.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The firm value is given by:
Vt = Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
βj
[
qt+j −
q2t+j
2xt+j
− 1
2
ce2t+j
]]
(47)
The first order conditions with respect to qt and et are:
∂Vt
∂qt
= 1 − qt
xt
= 0 (48)
∂Vt
∂et
= Et
[
1
2
(
qt
xt
)2
B +
β
2
(
qt+1
xt+1
)2
BA+
β2
2
(
qt+2
xt+2
)2
BA2 + ...− cet
]
= 0(49)
Solving gives the expressions for qt and et as given in the proposition.
We now check the second order condition. The first order leading principal minor
of the Hessian is given by ∂
2V
∂q2t
= − 1
xt
< 0. The second order leading principal minor
is given by:
∂2Vt
∂q2t
∂2Vt
∂e2t
−
(
∂2Vt
∂et∂qt
)2
= Et
[
c
xt
+
B2
xt
[
βA2
xt+1
+
β2A4
xt+2
+
β3A6
xt+3
+
β4A8
xt+4
+ ...
]]
> 0
(50)
The first and second order leading principal minor of the Hessian are negative and
positive, respectively (assuming a positive cost variable). It follows that the Hessian is
negative definite. Consequently, the critical point is a maximum.
Proof of Proposition 2
Insiders’ optimization problem can be formulated as:
Mt = max{qt+j ,et+j ;j=0..∞}
Et
[ ∞∑
j=0
βj (pi(qt+j, et+j) − θES,t+j(pi(qt+j, et+j)|It+j))
]
(51)
where pi(qt+j, et+j) = qt+j − 12
q2t+j
xt+j
− 1
2
ce2t+j and It denotes the information available
to outsiders at time t, i.e., It = {st , st−1 , st−2 , st−3 , ...}. We guess the form of the
solution and use the method of undetermined coefficients (and subsequently verify this
conjecture). The conjectured solution for outsiders’ rational expectations based on the
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information It is as follows:
ES,t [pi(qt, et)|It] = b +
∞∑
j=0
ajst−j (52)
where the coefficients b and aj(j = 0, 1, ...) remain to be determined.
The first-order conditions are:
∂Mt
∂qt
= 1 − qt
xt
− θ (a0 + βa1 + β2a2 + β3a3 + ...) = 0 (53)
∂Mt
∂et
= Et
[
1
2
(
qt
xt
)2
B +
β
2
(
qt+1
xt+1
)2
BA+
β2
2
(
qt+2
xt+2
)2
BA2 + ...− cet
]
= 0(54)
Combining both conditions gives the optimal output and effort policy:
qt =
[
1 − θ
∞∑
j=0
ajβ
j
]
xt ≡ Hxt (55)
et =
H2B
2c(1− βA) ≡ e (56)
Outsiders rationally anticipate these policies and can therefore make inferences about
the latent variable xt on the basis of their observation of current and past sales st−j
(j = 0, 1, ...). We know that st = qt + t. Consequently, observed sales st are an
imperfect (noisy) measure of the output qt chosen by insiders, and therefore also of the
latent variable xt, as is clear from the following “measurement equation”:
st = H xt + t with t ∼ N(0, R) (57)
Outsiders know the variance R of the noise and the parameters A, B and Q of the
“state equation”:
xt = Axt−1 + B e + wt−1 with wt−1 ∼ N(0, Q) for all t (58)
Using a standard Kalman filter the measurement equation can be combined with the
state equation to make inferences about xt on the basis of current and past observations
of st. This, in turn, allows outsiders to form an estimate of realized income pit. It can
be shown that the Kalman filter is the optimal filter (in terms of minimizing the mean
squared error) for the type of problem we are considering (see Chui and Chen (1991)).
We focus on the “steady state” Kalman filter, which is the estimator xˆt for xt that
is obtained after a sufficient number of measurements st have taken place over time
39
for the estimator to reach a steady state. One can show (see Chui and Chen (1991),
p78) that the error of the steady state estimator, xt − xˆt, is normally distributed
with zero mean and variance P , i.e., ES,t[xt − xˆt] = 0 and E[(xt − xˆt)2] = P , or
p(xt|It) ∼ N(xˆt, P ), where xˆt is given by:
xˆt ≡ ESt[xt] = Axˆt−1 +Be + K [st − H (Axˆt−1 +Be)] = (Axˆt−1 +Be)λ + Kst
(59)
where:
λ ≡ (1 − KH) and K ≡ H P
H2P + R
and where P is the positive root of the equation:
P = A2
[
1 − H
2P
H2P + R
]
P + Q (60)
or equivalently, P is the positive root of the equation:
H2P 2 + P
[
R(1− A2) − QH2] − QR = 0 (61)
K is called the “Kalman gain” and it plays a crucial role in the updating process.42
Substituting xˆt−1 in (59) by its estimate, one obtains after repeated substitution:
xˆt = eBλ
[
1 + λA+ λ2A2 + λ3A3 + ...
]
+ K
[
st + λAst−1 + λ2A2st−2 + λ3A3st−3 + ...
]
=
eBλ
1− λA + K
∞∑
j=0
λjAjst−j (62)
Using the conjectured solution for qt it follows that outsiders’ estimate of income
42If there is little prior history regarding sales st then Kt itself will vary over time because Pt, the
variance of the estimation error, initially fluctuates over time. Once a sufficient number of observations
have occurred Pt, and therefore Kt, converge to their stationary level P and K. A sufficient condition
for the filter to converge is that λ A < 1. The order of convergence is geometric (see Chiu and Chen,
1991, Theorem 6.1 on Page 88).
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at time t is given by:
ES,t[pit] = ESt
[
Hxt − H
2xt
2
− 1
2
ce2
]
(63)
=
(
H − H
2
2
)
xˆt − 1
2
ce2 (64)
=
(
H − H
2
2
)[
λBe
1− λA + K
∞∑
j=0
(λA)j st−j
]
− 1
2
ce2 (65)
= b +
∞∑
j=0
ajst−j (66)
where the last step follows from our original conjecture given by equation (52). This
allows us to identify the coefficients k and aj:
b =
(
H − H
2
2
)[
λBe
1− λA
]
− 1
2
ce2 (67)
aj =
(
H − H
2
2
)
K (λA)j (68)
For this to be a rational expectations equilibrium it has to be the case (see equation
(55)) that:
H = 1 − θ
∞∑
j=0
ajβ
j (69)
= 1 −
θ
(
H − H2
2
)
K
1− βλA (70)
Simplifying gives the condition for H in the proposition. Since aj > 0 for all j, one
can immediately verify that the second order condition for a maximum is satisfied (see
also proof proposition 1).
Finally, we calculate the expected value and variance of the estimate’s error: pit− pˆit.
We make use of the known result that the error with respect to the steady state
estimator for xt is normally distributed with zero mean (i.e., ES,t[xt − xˆt] = 0) and
variance P (i.e., ES,t [(xt − xˆt)2] = P ). Hence,
ES,t[pit − pˆit] = ES,t [h(xt − xˆt)] = 0 (71)
ES,t[(pit − pˆit)2] = ES,t
[
h2(xt − xˆt)2
]
= h2 P (72)
where h ≡
(
H − H2
2
)
.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Actual income is given by:
pit = qt − q
2
t
2xt
− 1
2
ce2 = hxt − 1
2
ce2 (73)
We know from the proof of proposition 2 that pˆit = ES,t[pit] = b +
∑∞
j=0 ajst−j (where
the values for b and aj are defined there). Lagging this expression by one period, it
follows that pˆit − λApˆit−1 = hKst + hλBe − (1−λA) ce22 . Substituting this expression
into the target adjustment model (26) gives:
λA pˆit−1 + Khst + k = pˆit−1 + (1− λA)pi∗t − pˆit−1 + λApˆit−1 (74)
Simplifying and solving for pi∗t gives equation (28).
Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that xˆ0 ≡ ES,0[x0] = x0 when the equity is issued. As a result, outsiders
and insiders predict the same future path for xt at time t = 0. Indeed,
ES,0[x1] = A xˆ0 + B e = E0[x1] (75)
ES,0[x2] = A
2 xˆ0 + AB e + B e = E0[x2] (76)
ES,0[x3] = ... (77)
Therefore, insiders and outsiders value the company identically. Let us calculate next
the firm value.
E0[pi0] = hx0 − 1
2
ce2 (78)
βE0[pi1] = β
(
hAx0 + hBe − 1
2
ce2
)
(79)
β2E0[pi2] = β
2
(
hA2x0 + hABe + hBe − 1
2
ce2
)
(80)
β3E0[pi3] = β
3
(
hA3x0 + hA
2Be + hABe + hBe − 1
2
ce2
)
(81)
β4E0[pi4] = ... (82)
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Hence,
V0 = E0[
∞∑
j=0
βjpij] (83)
= hx0
(
1 + βA + β2A2 + β3A3 + ...
)
+ hBeβ
(
1 + βA + β2A2 + β3A3 + ...
)
+hBeβ2
(
1 + βA + β2A2 + ...
)
+
hBeβ3
1− βA +
hBeβ4
1− βA + ... −
ce2
2 (1− β)
=
h
(1− βA)
(
x0 +
Beβ
1− β
)
− 1
2
ce2
(1− β) . ♦ (84)
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Figure 1: Production efficiency
The figure examines how production efficiency is affected by the variance of measurement errors (R), the variance
of the latent cost variable xt (Q), the autocorrelation at lag one of the latent cost variable (A) and outsiders’ real
ownership stake (θ). Production efficiency is measured by comparing actual effort (et), unconditional mean output
(E(qt)) and unconditional mean income (E(pit)) relative to their first-best level. The baseline parameter values used
to generate the figures in this paper are: A = 0.8, B = 1, c = 1, Q = 4, R = 1, β = 0.95 and θ = 0.8.
Figure 2: Speed of Adjustment
The figure examines how outsiders’ real ownership stake (θ), the autocorrelation at lag one of the latent cost variable
(A), the variance of measurement errors (R) and the variance of the latent cost variable xt (Q) affect the speed of
adjustment (SOA) of reported income to the income target. The speed of adjustment is given by SOA = 1 − λA.
The total amount of smoothing (measured by Aλ) is split up in its two components: financial smoothing (measured
by Aλ[H = 1]) and real smoothing (measured by Aλ−Aλ[H = 1]). The baseline parameter values used to generate
the figure are the same as before, i.e., A = 0.8, B = 1, c = 1, Q = 4, R = 1, β = 0.95 and θ = 0.8.
Figure 3: Total firm value and outside equity value
The figure plots the total initial firm value V0 (panel A) and outside equity value S0 (panel B) as a function of
outsiders’ real ownership stake (θ) for three different levels of audited disclosure quality (κ). The inverted U-shaped
curves in panel B are the so-called “outside equity Laffer curves”. The baseline parameter values used to generate
the figure are the same as before, i.e., A = 0.8, B = 1, c = 1, Q = 4, R = 1, β = 0.95 and θ = 0.8.
